The problem of aggregation of preferences for asymmetric players having different utilities and discount rates is addressed. It is illustrated how time-consistent cooperative strategies can be Pareto dominated by noncooperative feedback Nash equilibria. A dynamic bargaining procedure with nonconstant weights is presented. Nonconstant weights are obtained as the maximizers of a Nash welfare function. Three common property resource games are analyzed. Linear strategies are derived for appropriated weight functions including, in particular, those obtained from a dynamic Nash bargaining procedure.
Introduction
In the study of intertemporal choices it is customary in economics to consider the so-called Discounted Utility (DU) model, introduced in Samuelson (1937) . In the DU model, agent's time preferences are characterized by a single parameter, the constant discount rate of time preference. However, empirical observations seem to show that predictions of the DU model sometimes disagree with the actual behavior of decision makers (see e.g. Frederick et al. (2002) and references therein). In addition, if there are several players, although it is typically assumed that all economic agents have the same rate of time preference, there is no reason to believe that consumers, firms or countries have identical time preferences for utility streams. In that case a natural question arises: how to aggregate preferences? A social planner could simply add the intertemporal utility functions of all agents. In the absence of a social planner, if cooperation is permitted, economic agents could decide to coordinate their strategies in order to optimize their collective payoff. However, in this framework, as in hyperbolic discounting, a problem of time-consistency arises: what is optimal for the coalition or the society at time t will be no longer optimal at time s, for s > t.
There are many papers that have addressed the issue of aggregating preferences of heterogeneous agents in a dynamic setting. Li and Lofgren (2000) and Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) have restricted their attention to efficient but time-inconsistent policies (although Hara (2013) proves that, in a continuous time equilibrium model, the more heterogeneous the consumers are in their impatience, the more dynamically consistent the representative consumer is). Recent papers (Ekeland and Lazrak (2010) , Ekeland et al. (2015) , Karp (2016) ) have justified the introduction of weighted sums of exponentials in nonconstant discounting models with one decision maker as a way to represent the time preferences in overlapping generation models ) and Marín-Solano (2015) propose different approaches in the study of time-consistent equilibria in case players are asymmetric, not just in their discount rates, but also in their utility functions.
Our starting point in this paper is to consider the most natural way to address the problem of finding time-consistent policies if agents which heterogeneous discount functions can cooperate -or if there is a social planner aggregating their preferences -. We simply add the individuals intertemporal utility functions and look for -as in hyperbolic discounting -time-consistent policies. In this approach there are implicit two fundamental assumptions: all players can cooperate at every instant of time t, and the different t-coalitions (coalitions at time t) lack precommitment power for future decision rules. Somehow, in the setting of intergenerational models, if we interpret in an instant of time as a generation, previous papers assume intragenerational but not intergenerational cooperation. As in nonconstant discounting -that can can be seen as a problem of aggregating time preferences if agents share the same instantaneous utility function but discount the future at different rates -, time-consistent equilibria are computed by finding subgame perfect equilibria in a noncooperative sequential game where agents are the different t-coalitions (representing, for instance, different generations). However, the time-consistent "cooperative" solutions obtained in this way can have some important drawbacks that we list below.
First of all, such time-consistent solutions are not Pareto efficient, in general. In the study of collective decisions of individuals choosing a common consumption stream, Jackson and Yariv (2015) show that every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions is time-inconsistent if time preferences of the individuals are heterogeneous 2 . Hence, unless discount rates are equal, time-consistent policies cannot be obtained, in general, by maximizing a weighted sum (with constant weights) of the initial intertemporal utility functions of all players (the "0-coalition"). In any case, this result indicates that there is a problem of rationality of Pareto efficient solutions in this setting: unless there is precomitment power, they will not be followed in the future. The (rational) time-consistent cooperative equilibria is not Pareto efficient but is constrained Pareto efficient, in the sense that this solution at time t is Pareto efficient for the t-coalition, constrained to the future behavior of the agents 3 .
A natural consequence of the constrained Pareto efficiency of time-consistent cooperative solutions is that it is advantageous for the whole group to collaborate at each time t. Hence, if cooperation is not forbidden and the joint preferences are represented by the sum of players intertemporal utilities, the rational choice for them is to follow the decision rule described by the time-consistent cooperative solution. However, Marín-Solano (2015) showed with a simple example that time-consistent cooperative solutions can be inefficient for the group: joint payments can be higher if players act in a fully noncooperative way. In those cases, players are better off if cooperation is forbidden than if it is allowed. In addition, time-consistent cooperative equilibria seem to be extremely cumbersome to compute, as was illustrated in de-Paz et al. (2013) in the simplest problem of dynamic management of an exhaustible resource with different isoelastic utility functions.
In this paper we first present an extension of the result in Marín-Solano (2015), by illustrating that noncooperative Nash equilibria can Pareto dominate time-consistent cooperative equilibria (which are just constrained Pareto efficient). Then, we propose an alternative to the timeinconsistent Pareto efficient solutions and to the time-consistent cooperative equilibria. The idea consists in introducing nonconstant weights for the players. Since the games played at different moments are different games (the initial conditions change along time), it seems natural to assume that players at different times can have different weights (related to different bargaining powers) in the joint coalition, depending on the initial conditions at each game. The idea of introducing time-varying or time-dependent weights in a problem with heterogeneous agents is not new. Sorger (2006) proposed a new solution concept, the recursive Nash bargaining solution, in dynamic games with heterogeneous players in a discrete time setting with changing weights. According to this solution, knowing the decision rule at future periods s = t+1, t+2, . . . , agents look for a weighted Nash bargaining solution in which the status quo or threat point is given by the payoffs of the players if they do not cooperate just at period t. In a continuous time setting, Marín-Solano (2014) suggested to introduce nonconstant weights in problems with rather general discount functions: knowing the decision rule of players in all future s-coalitions, members of the t-coalition (for t < s) decide which is the "optimal" policy at time t for general weight functions. More recently, Yeung and Petrosyan (2015) consider also nonconstant weights in a discrete time setting. Note that the way nonconstant weights are introduced in the above mentioned papers is different to that in the previous literature with time-consistent preferences, in which weights are applied to the instantaneous utilities, not to the intertemporal utilities.
From the viewpoint of a social planner, what looks more natural is to simply add the intertemporal utilities of all agents, and to assign them -at least in principle, in the interest of fairnessequal weights. A social planner should require sound reasons to depart from this choice. But this solution becomes unsatisfactory in case it is clearly inefficient, or if it is simply very difficult to compute. In those situations, the introduction of a solution with unequal and nonconstant weights solving these problems can be justified. In any case, our bargaining solution fits better in a context without a social planner, in which agents bargain to form (or not) a coalition with no precommitment for the future. In problems with time-inconsistent preferences (e.g. hyperbolic discounting) it is customary to assume that agents at time t cannot commit themselves for their future actions at time s > t. In a similar way, if some weights are bargained by the agents in order to cooperate among them at time t, it seems natural to assume that they cannot commit for future weights in the game played at future moments s > t. Instead, they would depend on the state of the system at time s.
Our contributions in this paper are the following.
• First, we provide an example in which noncooperative payoffs Pareto dominate payoffs obtained from time-consistent (rational) cooperative strategies.
• Second, we describe bargaining solutions with nonconstant weights. Nonconstant weights are derived by taking as threat points (in case of disagreement) the noncooperative feedback (Markov Perfect) Nash equilibria. Hence, disagreement leads to the noncooperative outcome at perpetuity. If solutions exist to this problem, they are, by construction, individually rational. Although in the search of fully time-consistent solutions it seems more "realistic" to adopt the Sorger's approach (Sorger (2006)), we do not follow it since we are interested in solving the problem of Pareto dominance by noncooperative outcomes.
• Finally, we compute the bargaining solutions in some common property resource games with a productive asset. For different and general time-distance discount functions, we study these problems for families of weight functions guaranteeing the existence of linear strategies in the stock of the resource. Some of these nonconstant weight functions can be obtained as the maximizers of a (possibly asymmetric) Nash welfare function.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revises the cooperative solution concept for problems with asymmetric players studied in the previous literature. Since this solution is not strictly cooperative, nor Pareto efficient, following Marín-Solano (2015) it is defined as a "t-cooperative equilibrium rule" for the t-coalition 4 . A brief review of the main results in Marín-Solano (2014) on nonconstant weights is also included. Section 3 discusses the Pareto inefficiency of the t-cooperative equilibrium. Section 4 introduces and characterizes the so-called dynamic Nash t-bargaining solutions. Section 5 consider three applications related to the joint management of a (nonrenewable and renewable) common property natural resource. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

The t-cooperative equilibrium
Let us consider an intertemporal decision problem with several agents in which players can coordinate their strategies in order to optimize their collective payoff. Alternatively, a social planner can look for the solution maximizing the aggregate preferences of all economic agents. If there is a unique and constant discount rate of time preference for all agents, Pareto efficient solutions can be obtained by solving a standard optimal control problem. However, in the case of different discount rates, joint preferences become time inconsistent. As in hyperbolic discounting, when agents lack commitment power but they can cooperate at every instant of time, they act at different times t as sequences of independent coalitions (the t-coalitions). Following Marín-Solano (2015), we call the time-consistent solution for this problem a t-cooperative equilibrium. If we identify a t-coalition as the "t-agent" in a problem with hyperbolic (or general time-distance) discounting, the t-cooperative equilibrium rule is the decision followed by that "sophisticated agent". Hence, this solution assumes or allows for cooperation among players at every time t, but is a non-cooperative (Markov Perfect) equilibrium for the non-cooperative sequential game defined by these infinitely many t-coalitions.
Let N be the number of players, and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X ⊂ R n the vector of state variables.
For each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, let c i = (c
variables, u i (x, c 1 , . . . , c N ) her instantaneous utility function, and θ i (s − t) ≥ 0 (θ i (t, t) = 1) her discount function representing how the player discounts, at time t, utilities enjoyed at time s.
Although our results can be extended to more general discount functions, for many of our discussions we will take constant discount rates, θ i (s − t) = e −ρi(s−t) . The time-horizon τ can be finite or infinite (τ ∈ {T, ∞}). The intertemporal utility function for player i at time t is given by
We assume that functions u i , g and θ i are of class C 1 , and
In a cooperative setting, we aggregate preferences as
If different weights λ i ≥ 0 are assigned to the players, the joint intertemporal utility function is given by
. In this section we will assume that all weights are equal, so we take λ 1 = · · · = λ N = 1. The generalization of our results to different constant weights is straightforward.
Since the discount functions are different, independently on the constancy or not of each player's discount rate ρ i (s) = θ i (s)/θ i (s), the joint time preferences are time inconsistent and, in order to find time-consistent solutions, the problem is solved as a noncooperative sequential game with a continuum of "players" (each "player" is each coalition at time t). Hence, we can follow the ideas in Karp (2007) , Ekeland and Lazrak (2010) or Yong (2011) , who suggested three different procedures in order to find subgame perfect equilibria for this sequential game. As in Ekeland and Lazrak (2010) , in the infinite horizon case (τ = ∞), we restrict our attention to stationary convergent Markovian strategies, i.e. strategies c i = φ i (x) such that there exists x ∞ < ∞ and a neighbourhood V of x ∞ such that, for every x 0 ∈ V , the solution to (2) along c = φ(x) = (φ 1 (x), . . . , φ N (x)) converges to x ∞ . For convergent strategies, the integral in (1) converges.
If c * (s) = φ(x(s)) is a continuously differentiable equilibrium rule for the problem (3) subject to (2), by denoting x t = x, the corresponding value function is
Although the differentiability condition on the equilibrium rule is no strictly necessary (see e.g. Marín-Solano and Shevkoplyas (2011) and Ekeland et al. (2015)), we will impose this regularity condition in the paper, that is verified in the examples analyzed in Section 5.
If the t-coalition has the ability to precommit its behavior during the period [t, t + ], the valuation along the perturbed control path c is given by
admissible c given by (4),
In the definition above, note that the maximum inc of P (x, φ,c, t) is achieved for the equilibrium rulec = φ(x, t) (Ekeland and Lazrak (2010)).
is such that the functions
are of class C 1 and
If τ = ∞, equilibrium strategies are stationary and the value functions V i are time-independent. If, in addition, θ i (s − t) = e −ρi(s−t) (constant discount rates), we can write the dynamic program-
At first look, Equation (7) is very similar to the standard DPE. Obviously, this is the standard HJB when ρ 1 = · · · = ρ N = ρ. However, the standard DPE in the present value formulation, providing the optimal solution from the viewpoint of the coalition at the initial time, is given by The key point is that, if discount rates are not equal, we cannot isolate the exponentials in the right hand term of equation (8) . As a result, we cannot write a current value formulation of (8) . On the contrary, if the discount rates are not all equal, a present value formulation of the DPE (7) giving rise to time-consistent solutions does not exist. The time-consistent solutions to (7) are stationary (time independent) Markov strategies, whereas there are not stationary (time-independent) Markov strategies solving equation (8).
The case of general nonconstant weights
The idea of introducing nonconstant weights is to look for t-cooperative equilibria with just one but very important difference: weights of players in each t-coalition are not necessarily equal nor constant. In general, they will be the result of a bargaining process at every time t. Since the initial conditions for each t-coalition depend on the state of the system at time t, if x(t) = x t , following Marín-Solano (2014), the problem of the t-coalition is to "maximize"
subject to (2) , where λ i (x t , t) ≥ 0, for every i = 1, . . . , N . Coefficients λ i (x t , t) represent the weight of agent i at state x t and time t in the t-coalition 6 . Hence, at time t, given the initial state x t , and knowing which will be the equilibrium decision rule of future s-agents, the members of the t-coalition decide their decision rule and bargain their current weight. Note that we are not weighting the instantaneous utilities ("inside" the integral, see e.g. Munro (1979) or Hara (2013)), but we are introducing nonconstant weights in the expression of the intertemporal utility function (9) (i.e., "outside" the integral).
Remark that there are two sources of time-inconsistency in Problem (9) . First, there is the timeconsistency problem related to the presence of different discount functions (and hence changing time preferences of the different t-coalitions). In addition, the introduction of changing weights generates also time-inconsistent preferences, since the joint intertemporal utility to be optimized changes along time. This applies also to the problem with constant and equal discount rates of time preference, in which the only source of time-inconsistency are the changing weights. Problems with one decision maker where instantaneous utilities of each t-agent depend also on the current state x t were studied in Yong (2011) .
is a continuously differentiable equilibrium rule, for i = 1, . . . , N , the joint value function is
where
We assume that, along the equilibrium rule, the value function (10) is finite (i.e. the integral converges). In addition, functions λ i (x, t), i = 1, . . . , N , are continuously differentiable in all their arguments, and equilibrium rules are assumed to be (at least) continuous. 6 It is customary to demand
We do not impose this condition since the solution depends just on the relative weights.
Next, for > 0, if the t-coalition precommits its behavior during the period [t, t + ] by following the decision rule c (s), for s ≥ t (see (4) ), the valuation along the perturbed control path c is
Definition 2 A decision rule c
with V (x, t) and V c (x, t) given by (10) (11) and (12), respectively, for any admissible c (s).
We use the expression t-bargaining since weights λ i (x t , t) are chosen by each t-coalition. The following proposition characterizes the dynamic t-bargaining solutions. We refer to Marín-Solano (2014) for a proof.
Proposition 1
If there exist N value functions of class C 1 given by (11) where
are continuous functions, and there exists a unique absolutely continuous curve
Marín-Solano (2014) assumes in the previous proposition that weights λ i (x, t) in (9) are exogenously given. If weights are derived through a bargaining process, the dependence of λ i (x, t) in (x, t) can be seen through a dependence on the value functions V i (x, t) of all the agents. Then, in the derivation of dynamic t-bargaining solutions, we can take weight functions to be of the form λ i (x, z 1 , . . . , z N , t), with (z 1 , . . . , z N ) = (V 1 (x, t), . . . , V N (x, t)). It is easy to check that the problem of "maximizing" (constrained to the future behavior)
is equivalent to Problem (9) with weights
Then we can solve the problem by applying Proposition 1 to the new weights Λ i (x, t).
Pareto inefficiency of the t-cooperative equilibria
The solutions to (8) are Pareto efficient in the "classical" sense, according to the preferences of the joint coalition at the beginning of the game. Therefore, if we compare the joint payoffs with those provided by Markovian (feedback) Nash equilibria if players act in a noncooperative way, the solution to (8) is "group efficient": at initial time, it gives higher payoffs to the coalition in case of cooperation. This result is clear since the corresponding maximization problem includes all strategies (and the noncooperative strategies, in particular). However, if commitment is not allowed, this solution becomes time-inconsistent. In general, if cooperation is permitted, (8) and (5-6) provide the right solutions to the joint "maximization" problem in case of precommitment (at t = 0) and no commitment, respectively. However, the time-consistent (in case of no commitment) t-cooperative equilibrium can be group inefficient: joint payoffs can be lower in the t-cooperative equilibrium than in the feedback noncooperative Nash equilibrium (Marín-Solano (2015)). In order to achieve this surprising result, it seems that players must be very asymmetric, both in the discount rates and in the instantaneous utility functions. In Karp (2016) , where players are symmetric in their utility functions, cooperation cannot be disadvantageous.
From a different viewpoint, the t-cooperative equilibria solving (7) can be seen as constrained (to the future behavior of the agents) Pareto efficient. In general, in problems with time-inconsistent preferences, agents at different moments are treated as different agents. If there are, e.g., 2 players and 3 periods, this means that we have a game with 2 × 3 = 6 players. Equations (8) and (7) are not addressed to compute Pareto efficient solutions for this 6-player game. It is not clear for us how to compute the Pareto efficient solutions for this new game in a general setting (in dynamic games with an arbitrary number of periods, or in a differential game) and, in any case, they will be timeinconsistent, in general. In this section we show with a simple example that the payoffs given by the (constrained Pareto efficient) t-cooperative equilibrium rule can be Pareto dominated by those obtained by playing in a completely noncooperative way. The key point is that, if commitment is not allowed but cooperation is permitted, both the cooperative solutions to the DPE (8) and the noncooperative Nash equilibria become, in general, time-inconsistent. In the latter case, given the decision rule of future s-agents (for s > t), it is optimal for agents at time t to cooperate if their objective is to maximize their joint payoff.
As a combination of the previous properties, and although it seems paradoxical, if cooperation is permitted, time consistent players will follow the t-cooperative decision rule also in case noncooperation is advantageous. In order to avoid this result, an everlasting unique regulator could commit the behavior of future agents for the whole time horizon, or to forbid coordination among players when necessary. In Section 4 we present an alternative, a time-consistent dynamic bargaining procedure, that can be useful, at least in some cases, in finding time-consistent and individually rational cooperative equilibria.
Next we show how the t-cooperative equilibrium rule can be, not just Pareto inefficient, but Pareto dominated by completely noncooperative outcomes. For computational reasons and to better illustrate the result, we take an example with just 2 players and in a discrete time setting with finite number of periods. At initial time, there is a resource x 0 to be consumed along time t = 0, . . . , T − 1. If c it denotes the quantity of the resource that agent i (for i = 1, 2) consumes in period t, so x t+1 is the remaining quantity of the resource, then x t+1 = x t − c 1t − c 2t . Let u i (c it ) be the (strictly increasing and concave) utility function of player i from consumption at period t, and δ i ∈ (0, 1] the discount factor of player i. First we restrict our attention to the case with T = 2.
t-cooperative equilibria. For the calculation of the t-cooperative equilibrium rules, we first solve the problem at final time, max
subject to x 2 = x 1 − c 11 − c 21 , with x 1 given .
Since the utility functions are strictly incresings, we can assume that at final time the resource is exhausted, so that x 2 = 0. Let (c problem. Then, at time t = 0 we solve max (c10,c20)
subject to x 1 = x 0 − c 10 − c 20 , with x 0 given .
We denote the corresponding solution as (c For this problem we have computed some of the t-cooperative equilibria and noncooperative equilibria in case u 1 (c 1 ) = ln c 1 and
), for i = 1, 2, be the payoffs of the two players under the tcooperative and the noncooperative decision rules. In the case of the noncooperative equilibria, we consider linear strategies φ n it (x t ) = a it x t . In our analysis we take x 0 = 10, δ 1 = 0.95, 1 ≤ λ ≤ 10 and 0.05 ≤ δ 2 ≤ 0.95. For these values of the parameters, in most of cases, t-cooperative payoffs are not Pareto dominated by the noncooperative payoffs. However, if players are sufficiently asymmetric, both in their preferences (utility functions) and degree of impatience (discount rates), we have found many situations in which U We have performed the same analysis for the case of 3 periods and the number of situations in which both players are better off not collaborating at all seems to be similar. Table 2 presents some of these results. Although these results are quite surprising at first sight, they are not new in the economics literature. Related inefficiency results have been found in previous studies on disadvantageous cooperation (Rogoff (1985) ), disadvantageous monopsony (Maskin and Newbery (1990)) or disadvantageous monopoly (Karp (1996) ). In a different context with hyperbolic preferences, Krusell et al. (2002) and Hiraguchi (2014) found that aggregate welfare in the market outcome weakly dominates the outcome under a social planner.
Dynamic Nash t-Bargaining Solution
In the dynamic t-bargaining solution, weights are, in principle, arbitrary functions, that can be chosen according to different criteria. In this section we propose to use Nash bargaining theory as a possible way to fix them. In Nash bargaining theory, payments are obtained as the maximizers of a Nash bargaining function (Nash (1953) ). These payments implicitly characterize the weights of players in the whole coalition. Munro (1979) proposed to use Nash bargaining theory with constant weights in a transboundary resource model with asymmetric players. In his model, the threat (status quo or disagreement) point is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, and weights are bargained at the beginning of the game. In order to avoid the problems of dynamic inconsistency (Haurie (1976) ) and time inconsistency of the solution, he assumed full commitment of economic agents. We propose to introduce nonconstant weights -as the result of repeated negotiations that take place at each moment t -as a natural way to eliminate this (unrealistic in most of cases) full commitment.
Let us assume that, at time t, players know which will be their decision rule c = φ(x(s), s) for future s > t as a reaction to their current decision rule. Then, as in the classical Nash bargaining solution, they compare what they get cooperating at time t (or during the time interval [t, t + ], with arbitrarily small) with what they receive otherwise (the status quo). Let us denote the threat point by (W 1 (x, t) , . . . , W N (x, t)). When players at time t try to reach an agreement and to derive their corresponding actions, they choose their policy in the time interval [t, t + ] as the maximizer of some "distance" between what they obtain in case of agreement and in case of disagreement. We assume that this distance is measured according to the generalized Nash welfare function with strictly positive bargaining powers
ηi .
For η 1 = · · · = η N = 1 we recover the unique bargaining solution satisfying the four classical axioms (in a "static game"): invariance to equivalent utility representations, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto efficiency. However, as Sorger (2006) arguments, in a 2-player game, the Nash bargaining solution corresponding to the relative bargaining power η = η 2 /η 1 = ln β 1 / ln β 2 (where β t i is the discount function of player i) is the limit (as time delay between offers approaches to 0) of the unique perfect equilibrium outcome of a Rubinstein-type alternating-offers model (see, e.g., Binmore (1987) ). Then it seems natural to introduce different bargaining powers related to the discount rates. , tx) , . . . , W N (x, t)) be a set of threat value functions. A decision rule (c 1 , . . . , c N ) = (φ 1 (x, t) , . . . , φ N (x, t)) is called a dynamic Nash t-bargaining solution corresponding to the threat point W (x, t) if V i (x, φ 1 (x, t), . . . , φ N (x, t)) − W i (x, t) > 0, for all i = 1, . . . , N , and
and, for all admissible c given as in (4),
It can be easily checked that, provided that V i (x, φ 1 (x, t), . . . , φ N (x, t)) − W i (x, t) > 0, the dynamic Nash t-bargaining solutions are the dynamic t-bargaining solution defined in Definition 2 with weights given by
or, since what are relevant are the relative weights λ i /λ j ,
Hence, we can use Proposition 1 for the computation of dynamic Nash t-bargaining solutions.
It remains to define the threat value functions. In our examples in Section 5 we follow the "classical" approach in which threat points are those obtained in case agents do not cooperate in the whole time interval [0, ∞) and follow Markov Perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). This means that, if players do not cooperate at time t, they will not cooperate forever. This approach seems to be rather unrealistic. What seems more realistic is to assume that, if players do not cooperate at time t, they will not cooperate along a (finite) time interval. However, since our objective in this paper is to look for dynamic bargaining solutions that are not Pareto dominated by MPNE, we will take as threat points the valuations according to the MPNE, so W i (x, t) = W n i (x, t), for i = 1, . . . , N . By construction, in this case, if there are bargaining powers η 1 , . . . , η N such that the corresponding Nash t-bargaining solutions exist, then the related payoffs are individually rational in the classical sense.
Common property resource games with asymmetric players
In this section we apply the results in the previous section to the search of time consistent equilibria in three common property resource games with heterogeneous agents coming from the literature of resource economics. The first model considers the joint management of an exhaustible natural resource in case players have isoelastic utilities with different marginal elasticities. The second model introduces a linear production function. This model can be useful in the analysis of a renewable resource near a stationary point. Alternatively, our analysis with a linear production function can be useful in the study of other models. For example, Benchekroun (2002) considered production functions constructed as the union of two segments, one increasing and the other decreasing. Also, several pollution models have a linear dynamics in the state variable. Finally, our third model studies the joint management of a renewable natural resource for log-utilities and production function f (x) = x(a − b ln x), with a, b > 0. For these models we provide conditions on the functional form of the (nonconstant) weights of players for the existence of linear strategies. These strategies have an important advantage: due to its simplicity, they are easier to implement in practical applications. In addition, as we show, linear strategies solve the dynamic Nash t-bargaining problem, with the threat point corresponding to the payoffs if players act according to noncooperative feedback (Markovian) strategies, for the above mentioned models.
An exhaustible resource model with general isoelastic utilities
First we study the management of an exhaustible natural resource in case players have general isoelastic utilities, with different marginal elasticities. The intertemporal utility function of Player i is given by
with σ i > 0, σ i = 1, for i = 1, . . . , N . The stock of the resource evolves according tȯ
In this model, the stock of the resource converges in all the solution concepts to the stationary state x ∞ = 0.
Noncooperative Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium
The problem in which players do not cooperate and have constant discount rates has been studied with full detail in the literature. We can easily derive the solution for the case of general timedistance discount functions. We restrict our attention to stationary linear strategies.
If φ n j (x) denotes an equilibrium strategy for Player j = 1, . . . , N , then Player i aims to solve
where W i (x) denotes the value function of Player i. From the maximization problem we obtain c n i = (W i (x)) −1/σi . Since we are looking for strategies of the form c
By substituting in the expression of the value function we obtain
By identifying
In the standard case of constant discount rates, θ i (τ ) = exp(−ρ i τ ), we have
Remark 1 In the derivation of (16) and (17) we have implicitly assumed that the integral converges. Obviously, A n i in (17) must be positive for the existence of MPNE.
Dynamic t-bargaining solution
In general, t-cooperative equilibria seem to be extremely cumbersome to compute for this simple problem. In fact, no linear decision rules exist. In order to find analytical solutions, we introduce nonconstant weights. The following proposition characterizes the functional form of weight functions guaranteeing the existence of linear decision rules in the computation of the dynamic t-bargaining solutions described in Definition 2. 
an arbitrary continuously differentiable function.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Next, for this family of weight functions, the corresponding decision rules are presented.
Corollary 1
In Problem (14-15), for λ i (x) = ν i x σi h(x), i = 1, . . . , N , the corresponding dynamic t-bargaining solution is c i (x) = A i x and V i (x) = α i x 1−σi + β i , where
and coefficients α i and A i are the solution to the 2N equation system
In particular, if θ i (s) = exp(−ρ i s), then
Proof: It follows from (27) and (28).
Remark 2
In the previous derivations we have assumed that σ i = 1, for all i = 1, . . . , N . If there are players with logarithmic utilities, previous calculations can be reproduced in a similar way.
Dynamic Nash t-bargaining solution
Once we have computed both the MPNE and the dynamic t-bargaining solutions, we can use (13) for the calculation of the dynamic Nash t-bargaining solution. From the results in Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2, for the case of constant but different discount rates, we have:
. . , N . The dynamic Nash t-bargaining is given by Corollary 1 with weight functions λ i (x) = ν i x σi−1 (i.e. h(x) = 1/x) and coefficients ν i , α j and A k , for i, j, k = 1, . . . , N , solving
Proposition 3 provides a sound justification to the use of some of the (a priori) arbitrary weight functions introduced in Section 5.1.2. The use of these weight functions is not only necessary for the existence of linear decision rules, but weights of the form λ i (x) = ν i x σi−1 h(x) are the natural outcome of the dynamic Nash t-bargaining procedure described in Definition 3, that extend the standard (asymmetric) Nash bargaining function to a setting in which agents bargain their weight at every instant of time.
An extension: a linear production model
The results of Section 5.1 can be easily extended to the case of affine production functions of the form f (x) = ax + d, with a, d real numbers. The evolution of the stock of the resource is described byẋ
where c i denotes the harvest rate of agent i. Agents aim to maximize the sum of discounted utilities. Equation (18) can be interpreted as a model of a productive asset with constant gross return, or as a model analyzing the equilibrium harvest/consumption rates in the exploitation of a common access renewable resource near a stationary state x ∞ . Note that, in the study of the dynamics near a x ∞ , we can take the linear approximation
is an arbitrary production function, we can apply the results in Karp (2007) and Ekeland and Lazrak (2010) to deduce that, in general, multiple equilibria exist for this kind of problems. Then, in the analysis near a stationary state, first we have to choose a particular state in order to eliminate the indeterminacy in the values of the coefficients a and d in equation (18) .
In the case of noncooperative MPNE, affine strategies c
In the tcooperative case, no affine decision rules exist unless marginal elasticities coincide. For the existence of affine (in the resource stock) dynamic t-bargaining decision rules, Proposition 2 can be easily generalized.
Proposition 4
In Problem (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) , affine dynamic t-bargaining solutions exist if, and only if, weight functions are of the form
with h(x) an arbitrary continuously differentiable function.
A common property renewable natural resource model with logutilities
As a final example, let us consider the problem of exploitation of a renewable natural resource with state dynamicsẋ
and utility functions
with µ i > 0, for i = 1, . . . , N .
For general time-distance discount functions with µ i = 1, noncooperative MPNE and t-cooperative equilibria were already derived in Marín-Solano (2014). The extension is straightforward and we summarize the results.
Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium
If players do not cooperate, stationary linear strategies exist and are given by
for i = 1, . . . , N . The corresponding value functions are of logarithmic type,
If θ i (s) = exp(−ρ i s), we recover the classical results:
Dynamic bargaining solutions
Again, we restrict our attention to linear strategies. In such a case a unique stationary state exists, avoiding in this way the problems related to multiplicity of equilibria. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 5
In Problem (19) (20) , linear decision rules exist if, and only if, weights are of the form λ i (x) = ν i h(x). Equilibrium rules are given by
and the corresponding value functions are of the form V i (x) = α i ln x + β i , where
Next we briefly compare the dynamic bargaining solutions with the MPNE. First of all, note that α i = α n i . Hence, in order to look for individually rational dynamic bargaining solutions admitting linear strategies, it suffices to look for weights verifying β i ≥ β n i , for every i = 1, . . . , N . With respect to the harvesting rule, it is easy to check, using (21) and (23) , that harvest rates verify c n i (x) − c i (x) > 0 if, and only if,
and this is obviously satisfied. Hence, as in the standard case with equal and constant discount rates, harvest rates are higher in the pure noncooperative setting than in the problem with t-cooperation.
Dynamic Nash t-bargaining solutions
As a way to select particular weights, we can compute the dynamic Nash t-bargaining solution.
, the corresponding weights are given by
Then in order to find the solution, we have to solve the equation system relating β i and λ i , i.e. Equations (24) and (25), with β n i given by (22) . Note that by assigning the more patient Player 1 a weight much higher than to the more impatient Player 2, we obtain a payoffs that are individually rational: V 1 (x) − W 1 (x) = 2.45796 and V 2 (x) − W 2 (x) = 1.25856. Hence, V 1 (x)+V 2 (x) > W 1 (x)+W 2 (x) and the group inefficiency result of the t-cooperative equilibrium is avoided. It is important to realize that the existence of dynamic Nash bargaining solutions is not guaranteed (for these or other values of the bargaining powers η i ).
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the limits of adding utilities if economic agents discount the future at different rates. Time-consistent equilibria can be strongly inefficient, since individual payments can be Pareto dominated by those obtained if players act in a completely noncooperative way. In those cases, players are better off if cooperation is forbidden than if it is allowed. Since timeconsistent t-cooperative solutions are, by definition, constrained (to future decision rules) Pareto efficient at time t, players will collaborate at each time t and noncooperative solutions become, in general, time-inconsistent if collaboration is permitted. Therefore, although payments can be higher if players act in a completely noncooperative way, rational agents will follow the inefficient time-consistent cooperative decision rule. In order to obtain this strong inefficiency result discount rates must be necessarily different. Another drawback, thinking in practical applications, of timeconsistent t-cooperative solutions is that, if players have different (instantaneous) utility functions, they are, in general, very difficult to compute.
In order to address (at least partially) these problems, non constant (state-dependent) weights are introduced. These non constant weights can be obtained as the maximizers of a Nash welfare function, by introducing in this way the concept of dynamic Nash t-bargaining solution. These ideas are applied to the study of three common property resource games: a model of an exhaustible natural resource with different isoelastic utilities, an extension of this model to the analysis of the joint management of a renewable resource near a stationary point, and the management of a renewable resource with log-utilities. For these models, for different general time-distance discount functions, linear (affine) strategies are derived for families of weight functions including, in particular, those obtained from the dynamic Nash t-bargaining procedure. 
First, let us assume that linear strategies φ i (x) = A i x exist. Then, from (26) We have to prove that there are value functions V 1 (x), . . . , V N (x) such that the quantity 
